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Abstract. Camera is a standard on-board sensor of modern mobile
phones. It makes photo taking popular due to its convenience and high
resolution. However, when users take a photo of a scenery, a building
or a target person, a stranger may also be unintentionally captured in
the photo. Such photos expose the location and activity of strangers,
and hence may breach their privacy. In this paper, we propose a co-
operative mobile photographing scheme called PoliteCamera to protect
strangers’ privacy. Through the cooperation between a photographer and
a stranger, the stranger’s face in a photo can be automatically blurred
upon his request when the photo is taken. Since multiple strangers nearby
the photographer might send out blurring requests but not all of them
are in the photo, an adapted balanced convolutional neural network
(ABCNN) is proposed to determine whether the requesting stranger is in
the photo based on facial attributes. Evaluations demonstrate that the
ABCNN can accurately predict facial attributes and PoliteCamera can
provide accurate privacy protection for strangers.
Keywords: Mobile Phone, Photo, Privacy
1 Introduction
Nowadays mobile phones usually have built-in cameras that facilitate capturing
photos. For instance, iPhone 7 is embedded with a 12-megapixel camera [23].
However, an increasing privacy concern has arisen as more and more pictures are
taken in people’s daily lives. When a user takes a photo of a scenery or a friend
with a mobile phone, it is likely that a stranger can also be accidentally included
in the photo, with the face clearly recognizable. Fig. 1 illustrates two examples.
In Fig. 1(a), the building is the target but a stranger is captured; in Fig. 1(b),
the photographer intends to picture the target person but two strangers are
accidentally included. In these examples, the photo can breach the stranger’s
privacy by revealing the stranger’s location and activity. Thus strangers’ privacy
should be protected.
Based on advanced techniques in computer vision, there exist several appli-
cations which can blur faces in a photo, such as ObscuraCam [2], Point Blur [6]
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(a) A stranger is included
when the photographer
pictures a building.
(b) Two strangers are in-
cluded when the photog-
rapher pictures a target
person.
Fig. 1: Privacy issues with photos taken by mobile phones.
and [8]. However, none of these commercial applications can inform the inclu-
sion of a stranger in a photo and allow him to decide whether to blur his face
or not. Only the photographer is allowed to determine the necessity of blurring
the stranger’s face.
Several recent works have been done to protect strangers’ privacy in photos
through blurring their faces. They differ in the way of determining whether a
stranger is in the photo or not. Our previous work [14] checks whether a stranger
is in a photo or not based on GPS locations of the photographer and the stranger.
Due to the dependence on GPS location, it does not work well indoor due to the
unavailability or inaccuracy of GPS. He et al. [27] design a system for protecting
photo privacy that identifies a stranger in a photo by recognizing his motion
patterns and visual appearance (e.g., clothes color) profiled into the system in
advance. However, users’ visual fingerprints need to be updated whenever they
change (e.g., changing clothes), which is not convenient. Zhang et al. [28] propose
a server-based system to protect privacy of photographed users that compares
the portrait of a user uploaded to the server and the portrait of the persons
included in photos. Their scheme considers full portrait captured in the photo
(i.e., the whole body), which is quite different from this paper that only considers
face. Also, their scheme assumes a trusted server from the privacy perspective,
which is not always available.
In this paper, we use facial attributes that do not change frequently (e.g.,
black hair or blond hair) to determine whether a stranger is in a photo or not.
Since such facial attributes are relatively stable, if a person is in a photo, by com-
paring the faces in the photo with his recent profile photo in facial attributes, the
person can be correctly matched to his face in the photo. Also, in photographing
scenarios, it is not very likely that the facial attributes of two nearby strangers
are exactly same, since the number of persons in a limited geographic area around
the photographer is usually not large. That means if facial attributes can be ac-
curately identified from photos, mismatch between faces and strangers will be of
a low chance. Thus intuitively facial attribute-based face-stranger matching is a
promising method to explore.
Based on facial attributes, we design a cooperative scheme PoliteCamera to
protect the privacy of strangers who are unintentionally included in photos taken
by mobile phones. PoliteCamera works as an application on the mobile phones for
both the photographer and the stranger. When a photographer takes a photo, he
(via the mobile phone) will notify nearby strangers of the potential risk of being
included in the photo via peer-to-peer short-range wireless communications (e.g.,
WiFi Direct [4]). If a stranger prefers not to be included in the photo, he can
send a blurring request to the photographer together with his facial attributes
included in the request. The photographer will check whether the requesting
stranger’s face appears in the photo or not based on the facial attributes sent
from the stranger and the facial attributes of faces captured in the photo. If the
attributes of a face in the photo match those of the requesting stranger, that
face is considered to be the stranger’s and it will be blurred in the photo.
The set of facial attributes will be carefully selected so that a combination of
attribute values is specific enough to differentiate different strangers nearby the
photographer but is not specific enough to uniquely identify who the requesting
stranger is in the real world. The number of possible attribute value combinations
should be reasonably large (e.g., tens of thousand). Then the probability for
two different strangers to have the same combination is low, since the number
of strangers around a photographer is usually small. The number of possible
combinations should also not be too large. In this way, each combination could
be owned by many people in the real world, and thus cannot be used to infer who
the stranger is. As described later, approximate match instead of exact match will
be used in PoliteCamera, which makes linking multiple appearances of the same
person difficult. Thus, the privacy risk of re-identification will be low. Moreover,
privacy-preserving computing technologies can also be applied to complete the
matching of facial attributes without sending the stranger’s facial attributes to
the photographer in cleartext, and in this way further protect the stranger’s
facial attributes from the photographer (see Section 2.4 for a discussion).
The privacy protection offered by PoliteCamera is based on the cooperation
between photographers and strangers. Although these two roles are separately
discussed, real-world users can take either role in different scenarios. Since every
user can be a stranger in many scenarios, users have a motivation to use this
system, and participation in this system means mutually protecting each other’s
privacy and benefiting everyone including self. This inter-user cooperation de-
sign is also motivated by many real-world systems such as collaborative filtering
recommender systems [19] and peer-to-peer video streaming systems [15]. Users’
privacy can be better protected when more people use this system. Although it
is not a perfect solution for the problem, it still significantly advances the state
of the art in this domain.
The contribution of this paper is summarized as follows:
– We propose a facial attribute-based system PoliteCamera for protecting
strangers’ privacy in mobile photographing. To the best of our knowledge,
PoliteCamera is the first scheme that makes nearby strangers aware of pos-
sible inclusion in a photo when the photo is being taken, allowing them
to determine whether to blur their face in the photo or not, and protects
strangers’ privacy under both indoor and outdoor scenarios, without using
any trusted server, human gesture, or special wearables.
– We design a novel adapted balanced convolutional neural network (ABCNN)
that can simultaneously predict multiple facial attributes from a photo, and
use it to determine the existence of requesting strangers in a photo.
– To avoid identifying the real target persons of a photo as a stranger, a
heuristic approach is employed to effectively filter targets to prevent incorrect
blurring.
– The proposed system is implemented, and extensively evaluated on real
datasets and in the field. Experimental results show the excellent perfor-
mance of the system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the design
of PoliteCamera. Section 3 presents implementation. Section 4 shows evaluation
results. Section 5 reviews related work. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 System Design
This section describes the design of PoliteCamera.
2.1 System Overview
Three types of entities are involved in the system: the photographer who takes
a photo, the target who is intentionally captured by the photographer, and the
stranger who is near the target and might be accidentally included in the photo.
The system is designed to protect the stranger’s privacy by giving an option
to the stranger to opt out from the photo. The general idea is that the system
notifies nearby strangers the possible inclusion in a photo, and blurs a stranger’s
face if the stranger sends a blurring request. A naive approach is to blur every
stranger’s face in the photo. However, this is not an ideal solution, since blurring
will inevitably affect the quality of the photo. To minimize the effect on photo
quality, our design only blurs a stranger’s face if he requests to do so. We assume
PoliteCamera is installed on both the photographer’s and the stranger’s mobile
phone. Each user of PoliteCamera provides one of his photos to the PoliteCam-
era app upon the installation of the system. Each user’s facial attributes are
learned from this base photo and stored in the system for future use. (The base
photo can be updated by the user but this does not need to be done frequently
since facial attributes do not change frequently.) When a stranger requests a
photographer to blur his face, he can send these attributes to the photographer
and the photographer will determine whether his face is in the photo based on
these facial attributes and blur his face if so.
There are two challenges with the approach. Firstly, there might be multiple
nearby strangers who receive the notification of potential privacy leakage by
the photo. Some of them may request to blur their faces but others may not
request so. Hence, we need to determine if the requesting stranger’s face is in
the photo or not, which is not trivial. Secondly, when the target is a single
person or multiple persons, we need to keep the target unblurred even if the
target’s phone mistakenly sends out a blurring request. Telling the target from
the stranger is necessary but difficult.
2.2 The Architecture and Workflow of PoliteCamera
As Fig. 2 shows, the system consists of six major modules: face detection and
preprocessing, blurring request and collection, facial attributes classifier, target
filter, stranger determination and face blurring. When a photographer takes a
photo, the face detection module will run on the captured image. If any face is
detected, the notification of possible inclusion in the photo will be sent to nearby
strangers via peer-to-peer short-range wireless communications. If a stranger
would like to blur his face in the photo, he sends a blurring request to the
photographer. To help the photographer determine if the requesting stranger is
in the photo, this stranger also sends his pre-computed facial attributes (e.g.,
gender, obtained from his face image when initializing the PoliteCamera app).
Upon receiving blurring requests, the photographer crops all the faces in the
picture, and then feed them into the pre-trained facial attributes classifier. By
comparing the facial attributes of requesting strangers and the attributes of
detected faces in the photo, the stranger determination module of photographer
can identify those requesting strangers captured in the photo. If a requesting
stranger is in the photo, the face blurring module of the photographer smoothly
blurs the corresponding face; otherwise, the request is ignored. In case the target
mistakenly sends a blurring request, the target filter module distinguishes the
target from the stranger based on specific defined rules, and keeps the target
unblurred in the photo.
The design of PoliteCamera depends on several available technologies in mo-
bile phones. In particular, face detection and preprocessing can be implemented
using APIs provided by the operating system on mobile phones, such as the
FaceDetector APIs in Android SDK. Similarly, peer-to-peer short-range wireless
communications can be set up by available technologies on most modern mobile
phones, such as WiFi Direct [4] and Bluetooth. We will introduce the implemen-
tation of these two modules in Section 3. Next, we will illustrate more details
about the rest four modules.
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Fig. 2: The architecture of PoliteCamera.
2.3 Facial Attribute Classifier
Given an input face image in pre-defined dimensions, this module aims to simul-
taneously output a set of facial attributes associated with this input image. In
particular, each facial attribute is a binary label, where +1 indicates the pres-
ence of the corresponding attribute, and -1 means its absence. In this paper, we
propose to train a facial attribute classifier through the ABCNN model where a
weighted objective function is constructed to maximize the prediction accuracy.
Formally, let I be the set of input images, and N be the number of facial
attributes. For a given image x ∈ I, let yi ∈ {−1,+1} be the binary label of
the ith attribute, where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} is the index of facial attributes. Let
H be the hypothesis space of possible decision functions, and fi(θTx) be the
decision function, where θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θN} is the network weights. Hence, the
loss function of the ith facial attribute can be defined as Li(fi(θ
Tx), yi). Let
E(Li) be the expected loss over the range of inputs I. Then the optimization
task is to minimize the expected squared error for each attribute.
∀i : fi = arg min
fi∈H
E(Li) (1)
For each input x and attribute i, the corresponding classification result ci(x)
and the according accuracy acci(x) can be obtained from the output of fi(x)
described as:
ci(x) =
{
+1 fi(x) > 0
−1 otherwise,
and
acci(x, y) =
{
+1 yi(x)ci(x) > 0
0 otherwise
(2)
As discussed above, the traditional approach treats facial attributes as N
independent tasks, and each classifier is trained independently. The typical loss
function for the ith facial attribute is constructed by choosing the hinge-loss
function, which is shown as:
arg min
θi
Li(fi(θ
Tx), yi) = arg min
θi
(max(0, 1− yi(x)fi(θTx))) (3)
However, a problem with the traditional approach is that training indepen-
dent classifiers cannot learn the latent correlations between attributes. To exploit
such correlations, the classifier should be constructed to learn all of these facial
attributes simultaneously. In addition, the attribute label distribution in the
training set should match with the corresponding distribution in the testing set.
Therefore, it is necessary to balance the dataset to train a better classifier. One
way to obtain a balanced dataset is to perfectly collect evenly distributed dataset
of images for each attribute. However, it will cause extra efforts since most of
data in real application is not evenly distributed, and finding such dataset may
be very challenging especially at a large scale. An alternative solution is to mod-
ify the loss function in order to simulate a balanced dataset. In our proposed
ABCNN, some changes are made to the objective function to address the im-
balance between the training dataset and the test dataset. Specifically, a mixed
objective function is proposed by considering the distribution difference between
training data and testing data as adapted weights. Firstly, the training distribu-
tion Si for each attribute i is computed by calculating the fraction of positive
samples Train+i (0 < Train
+
i < 1) and fraction of negative samples Train
−
i
(0 < Train−i < 1) in the training set. Given the binary testing target distribu-
tion Target+i and Target
−
i (where Target
+
i +Target
−
i = 1), an adapted weight
is assigned for each class of attribute i, as shown in Eq. (4) and Eq. (5):
p(i|+ 1) = 1 + ∆T
+
Target+i + Train
+
i
(4)
p(i| − 1) = 1 + ∆T
−
Target−i + Train
−
i
(5)
where ∆T+ = Target+i − Train+i and ∆T− = Target−i − Train−i . It can be
seen from the above equations that we will increase the weight of the ith facial
attribute if the fraction of positive or negative labels in the training data is less
than the testing data. The intuition is that the increment of those weights will
help balance the distribution difference between training data and testing data.
Correspondingly, we will decrease the fraction weights of positive or negative
labels in the training data if it is higher than that in the testing data. Then, these
adapted weights are incorporated into the mixed objective function. Instead of
using the hinge-loss function, a weighted mixed task square error is adopted as
the loss function, and the optimization problem of ABCNN can be expressed as:
∀i : arg min
fi∈H
E(L(x, y)) = arg min
fi∈H
E(
∑N
i=1 p(i|yi(x))||fi(x)− yi(x)||2) (6)
The optimization problem aims to find the optimal decision function f that has
the smallest error between predictions and target labels. Over an M -element
training set X with labels Y, from Eq. (6) we can get:
∀i : arg min
fi∈H
E(L(X,Y )) = arg min
fi∈H
E(
∑M
j=1
∑N
i=1 p(i|Yji(x))||fi(Xj)− Yji||2) (7)
The ABCNN architecture can be built by replacing the standard loss layer of
a deep convolution neural network (DCNN) with a layer implementing Eq. (7).
After the above classifier is trained, we can predict facial attributes by inputing
a face image with fixed dimensions (which are consistent with that of training
images) to the classifier.
2.4 Stranger Determination
This module aims to determine if a requesting stranger is included in the photo
or not and which face matches the stranger. This is done though thresholding
the difference between the facial attributes of the detected faces and those of
the requesting stranger. In fact, facial attributes predicted by the classifier is a
vector of binary values, where +1 indicates the presence of the corresponding
attribute, while −1 represents its absence. The difference is defined as the num-
ber of different attributes between two faces under the same set of attributes.
Formally, let N be the number of attributes associated with a face. For a given
face, its corresponding attributes vector V = [a1, . . . , aN ], where ai ∈ {−1,+1}
represents the ith facial attribute. We use Vr and Vs to represent the facial at-
tributes of the requesting stranger and a specific detected face respectively. The
inner product of Vr and Vs is Vr·Vs =
∑N
i=1 Vr[i]Vs[i]. If all the attributes are
identical that inner product should be N . The Vr[i]Vs[i] is −1 only when the ith
attribute in Vr and the ith attribute in Vs are different. Hence, the difference
can be obtained as:
diff =
N − Vr·Vs
2
(8)
As discussed before the facial attributes cannot be used to uniquely identify
a stranger. In order to further protect the stranger’s facial attributes from the
photographer, inner product computation can be done with a two-party privacy-
preserving scheme [5]. Usually the predication results from two images from the
same person cannot match exactly due to angle difference or some other reasons.
Thus a threshold is set to tolerate such minor deviations. The rule is that only the
difference between facial attributes of the requesting stranger and any specific
detected face is less than or equal to the threshold, we consider the detected face
belongs to the requesting stranger. Our evaluations show that it is a good choice
to set 1 as the threshold.
2.5 Target Filter
This module is designed to distinguish the target from the stranger in a photo,
so that the target’s face will not be blurred even if the target mistakenly sends a
blurring request. Specifically, if the target of a photo is one or multiple persons,
the task is filtering out the targeted faces; if the target is a building or something
else, we would like to avoid the stranger being mistakenly identified as the target.
Therefore, a heuristic approach is proposed to achieve this goal. Based on our
observations from real-world experience, the target is usually associated with
the following properties in the photo:
– One common goal of taking photos is recording beautiful moments. The
target is likely to be smiling when he is being pictured, since smiles make a
person more attractive and confident.
– The photographer usually intentionally makes the target’s face significantly
larger than others who are accidentally included in the photo. For instance,
if a stranger is too close to the camera and hence his face is larger than the
target’s, the photographer will usually stop picturing or move a little bit so
that the target is better captured into the photo. Moreover, considering that
there might be multiple targets appearing in the photo but with slightly
different face sizes (e.g., a group of people taking a picture), we expect to
filter all targets in the photo by comparing a detected face with the largest
face in the photo, which is considered as one of the targets’ faces by default.
If the size difference is less than a pre-defined threshold, we consider the
detected face as one of the target faces.
– Similarly, the photographer usually puts the target in a dominant position
of the photo. The central region is one of the most popular options, which
can highlight the target in the photo.
Consequently, smiling, face size and face position can facilitate deter-
mining if a face belongs to the target or not. Based on these observations, we
propose three rules to determine whether a person in the photo is a target or
not.
1. The person is smiling.
2. The person’s face is the largest one in the photo or slightly smaller than
the largest one by a pre-defined threshold. Based on our test, we find that
the average size difference between two targets’ faces in a photo is around
10%. Hence, if more than one face is detected, we compare the largest one
with the others. If the size difference between the largest one and a certain
face is less than or equal to 10%, we consider that face as one target face.
Otherwise, the detected face will not be treated as a target.
3. The person’s face appears at the central region of the photo. The central
region is defined as the middle section of horizontal trisections of a photo.
However, it is too strict if we determine a detected face is the target only when all
those three rules are satisfied, since sometimes not all of them are satisfied. For
instance, the target is not always smiling when the photo is taken. Considering
this, we determine that the face is the target if at least two of the three rules
are satisfied.
2.6 Face Blurring
The purpose of face blurring is to mask the features of a face in order to make
the face not recognizable, without degrading the quality of photo much. Similar
to our previous work [14], we adopt an approach based on the Gaussian Blur
algorithm [21] to smoothly blur faces. To conduct face blurring, we need to
determine a blurring area in the face enclosing the main identifiable features of
the face. In particular, we draw a square whose side length is 2.4 times of the
distance between eyes, and whose center is the middle point between eyes. Then
the Guassian Blur operation can be performed in the square blurring area.
3 Implementation
The facial attribute classifier was implemented using Python 2.7 and MxNet [3],
which is an open-source deep learning framework. WiFi Direct was used to con-
duct peer-to-peer communications between the stranger and the photographer.
The face blurring module was implemented as same as our previous work [14],
so some details are omitted here.
3.1 Face Detection and Preprocessing
Face detection is based on the FaceDetector class provided in Android SDK.
Faces in an image can be detected by calling the findFaces method of FaceDe-
tector. This method detects faces by finding pupils in the image, and returns
a number of detected faces into an array of FaceDetector.Faces class. For each
instance of Face class, the distance between two eyes of a face and the coordi-
nate of the middle point between two eyes can be obtained. Then we crop each
detected face with a square area, which is the same as the blurring square de-
scribed in Section 2.6. Also, the size of the cropped square is used to represent
the size of the corresponding face in the target filter module. To prepare for
target filtering, we need to detect the position of each face in the photo. To do
so, we evenly divide the picture into three regions (left, middle, right) along the
horizontal direction. Then for each detected face, we calculate the middle point
between its eyes. If the middle point is located in the middle region, we say this
face is in the central region.
3.2 Facial Attribute Classifier
This module aims to predict a set of facial attributes from a given face image.
As described in Section 2.3, we use ABCNN to predict the facial attributes and
ABCNN is implemented by the Python interface of MxNet [3]. In particular, we
build the ABCNN network by replacing the final loss layer of a 16-layer VGG
network from [22] by the loss function in Eq. (7), and the architecture shown
in Fig. 3. The architecture consists of 16 weight layers, including 13 convolution
layers and 3 fully connected layers, which are associated with over one million
weights. Since the network only accepts RGB image input with dimensions of
128*128 pixels, each cropped face obtained from the face detection and prepro-
cessing module should be scaled to that size before being sent into this classifier.
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Fig. 3: Architecture of the ABCNN network.
In this paper, the ABCNN network is trained on the CelebA dataset [16],
which is a large-scale facial attributes dataset. It contains 20 images for each
of over 10K celebrities, hence with a total of more than 200K images. The first
160K images are used for training, and the remaining 40K images are used for
validation and testing, specifically, 20K for validation and 20K for testing. For
our implementation, we use a set of pre-cropped and aligned face images pro-
vided by the CelebA dataset, and scale the dimensions of training RGB images
from 178*218 pixels to 128*128 pixels. Each image in the CelebA dataset is
annotated with binary labels of 40 facial attributes (e.g., ‘Young’ and ‘Male’).
However, in this work, we choose 16 out of the 40 attributes that do not change
frequently for the same person as our considered attributes. The 16 chosen fa-
cial attributes include {Arched Eyebrows, Bushy Eyebrows, Big Lips, Big Nose,
Point Nose, Black Hair, Blond Hair, Brown Hair, Gray Hair, Eyeglasses, Bald,
High Cheekbones, Narrow Eyes, Oval Face, Male, Young }. In addition, since the
‘smiling’ attribute is required for target filtering, we also add it into the classifier
(note that it is not used for stranger determination but only for target filtering).
4 Evaluations
To train the classifier, we set the batch size to 384 images per training iteration,
and hence the training process requires approximately 420 iterations to finish a
full epoch on the training set. The learning rate is initialized as 0.05, and reduced
by a factor of 0.8 every four epochs until it decays to 0.000001. We train the
ABCNN for 110 epochs with all images from training set on two NVidia K80
GPUs.
4.1 Model Selection
Classification accuracy is defined as the number of correctly predicted cases
divided by the number of testing images. From Eq. (2), we can derive the clas-
sification accuracy of each attribute i:
ei(X,Y ) =
1
Ntest
Ntest∑
j=1
acci(Xj , Yj) (9)
Consequently, we can evaluate the average classification accuracy by calculating
the average classification accuracy over all the N attributes:
E(X,Y ) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ei(X,Y ) (10)
The ABCNN prediction model is trained on the training dataset, but the
number of training epochs needed is determined based on the validation dataset.
Specifically, the accuracy trend when the number of training epochs increases is
shown in Fig. 4. As the training continues, the accuracy over the training dataset
keeps increasing. However, training for more epochs means higher cost. Thus,
based on the maximum accuracy over the validation dataset, we stop training the
ABCNN network after 80 epochs (with 89.84% validation accuracy) and use the
resulted model for performance evaluations in order to guarantee the coverage
of the model without too high cost.
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Fig. 4: Average classification accuracy vs training epochs.
Then based on Eq. (9) we evaluate the classification accuracy of each facial
attribute on the test dataset, including 16 attributes used for stranger deter-
mination and the ‘Smiling’ attribute for target filtering. The average accuracy
over those 16 attributes is also tested according to Eq. (10). As Fig. 5 shows,
the average accuracy is 88.53% (see the horizontal dashed line) which is pretty
high. Out of the first 16 facial attributes, 6 attributes outperform the average
performance, including Bushy Eyebrows, Black Hair, Blond Hair, Gray Hair,
Eyeglasses, Bald and Male. For example, the classification accuracies of Eye-
glasses and Bald achieves 98.31% and 98.34%, respectively.
To measure the performance of our proposed ABCNN in predicting the fa-
cial attributes, we compared it with the state-of-art algorithm proposed in [17].
They also construct a multi-task training classifier and the corresponding facial
attribute prediction and average accuracy are represented with the blue dashed
line and the horizontal blue solid line in Fig. 5, respectively. In addition, we
also compared the proposed ABCNN with [16] which uses the basic CNN model
to select features and inputs them to the SVM classifier for training. Its per-
formance is displayed by green line and green dashed line for facial attributes
prediction accuracy and average accuracy, respectively. ABCNN outperforms
both the multi-task training classifier in [17] and the CNN-SVM model [13].
4.2 Classification Consistency
Since the facial attributes are used for stranger determination, the trained clas-
sifier is expected to make consistent predictions given a specific person. That
is, given two different face images of the same person, ideally all the 16 facial
attributes obtained from the two images are identical. To evaluate classification
consistency, we use the LFW image database [7] that has been widely used in the
literature. Since images in the LFW database are organized by person, it is more
efficient to sample images for experiment. In this experiment, we randomly pick
50 persons, and a pair of different face images of each person (see Fig. 6 as an
example). The classification results over the two images in Fig. 6 are presented
in Table 1. It can be seen that the classified facial attributes of these two images
are exactly the same except ‘Big Lips’, ‘Brown Hair’ and ‘High Cheekbones’. Out
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Fig. 5: Classification accuracy of each attribute and average accuracy in testing.
of the 50 persons, the classification results for 32 persons are fully consistent.
For the rest 18 persons, 7 persons have 15 identical attributes, 8 persons have 14
identical attributes, and the remaining 3 persons have 13 identical attributes.
(a) First face image (b) Second face image
Fig. 6: Two different face images from the same person.
Besides, we examine the classification consistency on persons with more than
4 face images in the LFW dataset. In particular, we pick 2 pairs of different face
images for each of those 10 persons. Then we compare the predicted attributes
pair by pair, and hence perform 20-pair comparisons. As Table 2 shows, 8 pairs
of face images are labeled with the exactly the same attributes, and only 6 pairs
are labeled with 3 or more different attributes.
Furthermore, we examine the possibility of two different persons being pre-
dicted with identical attributes. We randomly pick 100 persons from the LFW
dataset, and perform facial attribute classification on a face image of each person.
Table 1: Facial Attributes Classification of Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b).
Facial Attributes Fig. 6(a) Fig. 6(b)
Arched Eyebrows No No
Bushy Eyebrows No No
Big Lips No Yes
Big Nose Yes Yes
Pointy Nose No No
Black Hair No No
Brown Hair Yes No
Blond Hair No No
Gray Hair No No
Eyeglasses No No
Bald No No
High Cheekbones No Yes
Narrow Eyes No No
Oval Face No No
Male Yes Yes
Young No No
Table 2: Classification consistency of 10 persons with 2 pairs of face images each.
Number of Identical Attributes 16 15 14 13 12 11 10
Number of Pairs 8 4 2 2 2 1 1
Then, we compare facial attributes of every person with those of the other 99
persons and hence 4950 pairs are compared in total. Only 144 pairs have exactly
the same attributes. All these results show that the classification consistency is
high.
4.3 Optimal Thresholding
The above consistency experiments show that facial attributes of two face images
from the same person may not be perfectly identical. Hence, a scheme that
depends on exactly matching of facial attributes between two faces will not
work for stranger determination. The stranger determination is implemented by
thresholding the difference of facial attributes between two compared face images
to allow a reasonable difference between these two faces. Hence, it is needed
to find a proper threshold. The goal is that we can obtain more true positives
without causing too many false positives under the threshold. Here, true positive
means two different face images of the same person being determined as the same
person. False positive means images of two different persons being determined
are from the same person. In this experiment, we pick 50 persons from the LFW
database, and two different face images with each person. In order to evaluate
false positive, 50 tests are conducted. In each test, we pick one face image from
the above 50 persons as the target, and choose another face image from a different
person to compare with the target. From the above classification consistency
evaluations, we consider 0, 1 and 2 as reasonable threshold candidates and show
the results in Table 3. Based on these results, we choose 1 as the threshold in
stranger determination which has good performance in both true positive and
false positive.
Table 3: Effectiveness of stranger determination under different threshold with
50 tests.
Threshold=0 Threshold=1 Threshold=2
# True Positives 36 45 48
# False Positives 1 3 12
4.4 Effectiveness of Target Filter
This test aims to examine how well the target filter module can detect the target
from a photo. In this experiment, we perform target filter on field photos from
two different sources where multiple targets might be in one photo. We use false
filtering rate to measure the performance, which is defined as the percentage of
times when not all targets in the photo are successfully detected or any stranger
appearing in the photo is mistakenly detected as the target.
First, we evaluate the effectiveness of target filter on 100 photos, which we
have pictured by mobile phone in the past, and at least one target person is
included in each photo. The result shows that the false filtering rate is only 8%,
which means the target filter only fails to detect the target in 8 photos. Fig.
7 illustrates two example photos of our test. Fig. 7(a) is a successful example,
but Fig. 7(b) is a failed example. The reason for unsuccessful target detection is
that the face is not at the central region of the photo, and ‘Smiling’ attribute is
falsely predicted as ‘No’. Based on our proposed three rules, only the rule based
on face size can be satisfied, and hence the target is not successfully detected.
(a) A test photo where the
target is successfully detected.
(b) A test photo where the
target filter failed.
Fig. 7: Target filter test on photos taken by the authors.
Then we pick 100 photos shared by our friends in Facebook from 10/01/2016
to 12/26/2016. At least one target person is included in each photo. Fig. 8
shows some example photos, where faces are blurred upon the friends’ request.
Similar to the above test, we run target filtering on these 100 photos. The false
filtering rate is 12%, which means the target filtering operation fails in 12 photos.
We look into each of those 12 photos, and find the same reason causing false
target filtering. When multiple targets are shown in the photo, the target at
the rightmost or leftmost is detected as out of the central region of the photo.
Also, this target was not smiling when the photo was taken or the ‘Smiling’
attribute is falsely predicted as ‘No’. As a result, in those cases, the rules based
on face position and smiling cannot be satisfied, and hence the target filter
cannot successfully detect all the targets in the photo. However, the overall
target filtering accuracy is still high.
Fig. 8: Target filter test on photos shared by friends on Facebook.
4.5 Accuracy of Protection
This part evaluates the effectiveness of our system in protecting the stranger’s
privacy. The experiments are conducted on our campus. Fig. 9 shows two exam-
ple experiment scenes.
Fig. 9: Example Experiment Scenes
True Protection Rate: This group of tests considers the scenario where one
target person and two strangers appear in the photo. We assume either one of
the two strangers or both of them request face blurring. The true protection rate
is defined as ratio of times when the faces of the requesting strangers are blurred
in the photo. For each requesting stranger, we conduct 10 tests separately. Fig.
10 shows an example where the right stranger’s face is successfully blurred. Table
4 shows the true protection rate which is high.
Fig. 10: Example of a successful protection.
Table 4: True Protection Rate
# Requesting Strangers True Protection Rate
1 90%
2 80%
False Protection Rate: Again we consider the scenario where one target per-
son and two strangers appear in the photo. Suppose the two strangers in the
photo do not request to blur their faces but other nearby strangers who are not
in the photo submit blurring requests. In this case, we define false protection rate
as the percentage of times when any of two strangers in the photo is mistakenly
detected as a requesting stranger and hence falsely blurred. To evaluate the false
protection rate in a noisy environment, we conduct simulations with 1, 3, 5 and
10 nearby requesting strangers separately. Specifically, in each test, we randomly
pick a certain number of entities from the LFW database, who act as nearby
requesting strangers, and one face image for each selected person. For each spe-
cific number of requesting strangers, 50 tests are conducted separately. Table
5 shows results with different number of requesting strangers. We can see that
false protection rate increases with the increasing number of nearby requesting
strangers. This is because the more nearby requesting strangers, the higher pos-
sibility of their facial attributes being overlapped with that of strangers in the
photo. Note that the false protection rate is as low as 3% with only one nearby
requesting stranger. Even under noisy environment with 3 nearby strangers who
request face blurring, the false protection is only 8%. The false protection rate
increases to 24% with 10 nearby requesting strangers, but this case does not
occur often in the real world.
Table 5: False Protection Rate
# Nearby Requesting Strangers
1 3 5 10
False Protection Rate 3% 8% 14% 24%
5 Related Work
Photo and Video Privacy Jung and Philipose [11] propose a system to protect
video privacy. If it detects the person being recorded is making certain gestures
like waving hands, the wearable camera will stop recording that person. Raval et
al. [18] design a system called MarkIt to protect video privacy. It detects sensitive
objects predefined by users in video, and those sensitive objects will be covered
with markers before releasing the video to third-party applications. Jana et al.
[9] design an OS abstraction Recognizer to enforce fine-grained access control
in augmented reality system by reducing the quality of raw sensor data. Darkly
[10] restricts untrusted applications from accessing raw data from perceptual
sensors.
Schiff et al. [20] implement a system to protect photo privacy by detecting
persons that wear special tracking markers and blurring their faces in photos.
However, people who want to protect their privacy must wear special markers
beforehand which is not suitable for our considered daily scenarios. Bo et al. [1]
propose a protocol to protect the privacy of people being pictured based on a
physical tag, which contains their privacy preferences. However, people have to
wear clothes with QR-code as privacy tags. Visual fingerprints have also been
used to detect whether a user is in a photo [27], but their scheme requires up-
date of visual fingerprints whenever there is any change (e.g., clothes change),
requiring too much intervention from people. Templeman et al. [25] propose an
approach to prevent photos from being shared with others by checking the at-
tributes extracted from the photo, such as location and content. PlaceAvoider
[26] is a context-aware system which can notify the photographer when an ap-
plication is going to capture photos in sensitive places. Zhang et al. [28] design a
photo capturing and sharing system to protect people’s privacy based on graph
representations of people’s portraits. Notisense [17] is implemented to notify by-
standers of nearby mobile sensing activities. Tan et al. [24] implement a system
to protect photo privacy based on the recognition of persons who are known to
the phone owner, and deny third-party applications to access these photos.
Facial Attributes Classification Kumar et al. [13] propose an approach
to train facial attribute classifiers. Features from manually-picked facial regions
for each facial attribute are separately optimized using AdaBoost algorithms. In
addition, independent SVM classifiers are trained by feeding optimized features.
In this approach, various features are learnt for each facial attribute, and an inde-
pendent SVM classifier is separately trained. Even though it is a valid approach,
it is not efficient for feature extraction and classification. Recently, with the in-
creasing popularity of convolution neural network (CNN), it has been leveraged
to extract more sophisticated features of facial attributes. For instance, Kang
et al. [12] propose gated CNNs, which aim to determine which regions of a face
are most correlated to corresponding attributes. Then, the output of such CNNs
is encoded into a global feature vector for training independent binary SVM
classifiers. Zhang et al. [29] apply CNNs to learn facial attributes, which are
used to infer social relations between pairs of identities with an image. Liu et
al. [16] design three CNNs, including two localization networks (LNets) and an
attribute recognition network (ANet). LNet is designed for localizing features in
face images, while ANet is trained on face identities and attributes to extract
features. Then, independent SVM classifiers are trained on those extracted fea-
tures. However, none of them can be directly used for imbalanced distributed
datasets.
6 Conclusion
We proposed a system PoliteCamera to protect strangers’ privacy who are ac-
cidentally captured in a photo taken by mobile phones. The system can inform
nearby strangers that they are possibly included in a photo and give them an
option to blur their faces in the photo. A novel ABCNN structure is designed
to predict facial attributes, where the facial attributes are used to determine
whether a requesting stranger is in the photo and which face in the photo be-
longs to him. We implemented a prototype system, and evaluated its performance
through experiments. The accuracy of the facial attributes prediction is better
than the state of the art, and experimental evaluations demonstrate that the
system can effectively protect strangers’ privacy.
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